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NOTE
"AIRBRUSHED OUT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CANON"t: THE EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING
OF GILES v HARRIS, 1903-1925
Samuel Brenner*
Richard H. Pildes argued in an influential 2000 article that the U.S.
Supreme Court's opinion in Giles v. Harris, which was written by
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, was the "one decisive turning
point" in the history of "American (anti)-democracy." In Giles,
Holmes rejected on questionable grounds Jackson W. Giles's chal-
lenge to the new Alabama Constitution of 1901-a document which
was designed to disfranchise and had the effect of disfranchising
African Americans. The decision thus contributed significantly to
the development of the all-white electorate in the South, and the
concomitant marginalization of southern African Americans. Ac-
cording to Pildes, however, the case was "airbrushed out of the
constitutional canon" despite its importance-perhaps, Pildes
theorized, because the American constitutional tradition takes is-
sues of democratic governance "off the map." Certainly, before
Pildes brought the case back to prominence, few of the standard
constitutional law casebooks even mentioned the decision. The
case, however, disappeared from the canon in a far more gradual
and nuanced manner than the epithet "airbrushed out of the consti-
tutional canon" would suggest.
This Note traces the ways in which the decision in Giles was re-
ceived and interpreted in both the general media and legal
scholarship in the two decades after the decision was handed down
in 1903. It argues that while during this period there was no con-
scious attempt to "airbrush" the decision out of the constitutional
canon, as the case gradually came to be viewed by some scholars
as one more concerned with procedural technicalities than with the
core meaning of democracy, constitutional scholars interested in
t Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT.
295, 297 (2000) [hereinafter Pildes, The Canon].
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studying questions of race and disfranchisement increasingly
looked toward cases (both democratic and antidemocratic) that
were perhaps procedurally simpler and cleaner
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INTRODUCTION
"In this bleak and unfamiliar saga" of the history of antidemocracyI in
the United States, argued Richard H. Pildes in his 2000 article Democracy,
Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, "there is one key moment, one decisive
turning point: the 1903 opinion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Giles v.
,2Harris." In 1902 Jackson W. Giles, an African American citizen of
Alabama, brought a test case to the federal courts alleging that new provi-
sions of the Alabama state constitution that were designed to disfranchise
(and had the effect of disfranchising) nonwhites violated the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments! In a relatively short-though controversial and
1. In explaining what he meant by "anti-democracy," Pildes noted:
If sustained attention to democracy itself has been startlingly absent from the constitutional ca-
non, so too has its antithesis: the history in American politics and constitutional law of anti-
democracy. For constitutional law played a role in sustaining the blatant manipulations of po-
litical institutions that kept America from fully becoming a democracy before 1965.
Recovering this history of the Supreme Court's removal of democracy from the agenda of con-
stitutional law, for most of the 20th century, is one way of bringing democracy to
constitutional thought today.
Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 296 (footnote omitted).
2. Id.
3. See Transcript of Record at 2-13, Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (No. 493). For
more on Giles v. Harris in historical context, see MICHAEL PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY:
DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1888-1908, at 122-23 (2001); REBECCA J. SCOTT, DEGREES OF
FREEDOM: LOUISIANA AND CUBA AFrER SLAVERY 195-98 (2005); RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO
RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT 140-47 (2004); Charles A.
Heckman, Keeping Legal History "Legal" and Judicial Activism in Perspective: A Reply to Richard
Pildes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 625 (2002); Pildes, The Canon, supra note t; and Richard H. Pildes,
Keeping Legal History Meaningful, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 645 (2002) [hereinafter Pildes, Meaning-
full.
Understanding Giles v. Harris
convoluted-opinion, the Supreme Court, led by Holmes, concluded that the
federal courts had jurisdiction over the question but could not provide Giles
his requested relief of being once again enrolled as a voter. Holmes's two
justifications for refusing to provide any relief to Giles were quite startling:
first, Holmes explained that if Giles was correct that the provisions of the
Alabama constitution violated the U.S. Constitution, then the Court could
have no part in ordering that Giles be enrolled in an unconstitutional voting
scheme; second, Holmes concluded that if there truly were a conspiracy of
white southerners to disfranchise African Americans, then any pronounce-
ment of the Supreme Court would be effectively useless. Holmes ultimately
boiled down the ruling in Giles to a single proposition: federal courts, sitting
as courts of equity rather than courts of law, would not consider "political
questions" dealing with such issues as enfranchisement or electoral appor-
6tionment. This general (at least as applied to race) rule,7 which was not
solely the creation of the Giles court,8 officially held sway until the land-
mark 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,9 which ultimately helped lead to the "one
person, one vote" standard applicable today.' ° The effect of the Giles ruling
during the first half of the twentieth century was normatively egregious:
Holmes in effect gave carte blanche to southern politicians-some of whom
expressed an intent, both before and after Giles, to craft voting provisions
that had the avowed purpose of disfranchising all nonwhites"-to do so, as
long as the laws they drafted were seemingly facially neutral.
4. Giles, 189 U.S. 475.
5. Id. at 486-88.
6. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 601,
626-27 (2007).
8. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849) (establishing the political question test in contro-
versies arising under the Guarantee Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
9. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Baker Court, in attempting to define the boundaries of the
political question doctrine, held that there is a political question (or "nonjusticiable political ques-
tion") when there is:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political de-
partment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudi-
cial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217. Charles argues in Democracy and Distortion that the "law-equity distinction is not en-
tirely persuasive" in the racial voting rights context, and that Holmes himself in Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536 (1927), circumvented the issue by describing a situation similar to Giles's as one in-
volving a "private remedy," and therefore comprising a legal, rather than equitable case. Charles,
supra note 7, at 627.
10. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) ("Legislators represent people, not trees
or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.").
11. See, e.g., Orville Vernon Burton et al., South Carolina, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE
SOUTH 191, 194 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994), cited in Pildes, The Canon,
supra note t, at 302 n.31 (quoting South Carolina Senator Benjamin R. "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman,
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Perhaps even more startling than Holmes's strained justifications in the
Giles opinion, however, especially given the normatively egregious practical
results of the decision, is that, as Pildes points out, as of the late twentieth
century Giles appeared to have been "airbrushed out of the constitutional
canon."12 In other words, as of the turn of the millennium contemporary con-
stitutional scholars had little knowledge or understanding of Giles.3 This
omission can be explained, Pildes implies, by "the longer constitutional tra-
dition" in the United States "in which issues of democratic governance were
off the map altogether."'' 4 Pildes is probably not suggesting that there was
some sort of active conspiracy to remove the decision from standard case-
books, or that scholars of constitutional law could not have read the decision
had they wished to. Rather, Pildes is suggesting that scholars teaching, writ-
ing about, and discussing American constitutional law neglected to focus on
this opinion. If the case truly was, or should be, the "ready focal point" of
"(anti-)democracy in American constitutional law,"' 5 then it remains for le-
gal historians to determine exactly how and when scholars began to ignore
who in 1900 announced proudly on the floor of the U.S. Senate that "[w]e have done our level best
[to disfranchise nonwhites]. We have scratched our heads to find out how we could eliminate every
last one of them. We stuffed ballot boxes. We shot them. We are not ashamed of it."); Congressman
Hardwick Appeals to Georgians, COLUMBUS ENQUIRER-SUN, Sept. 25, 1908, at 1 (quoting Con-
gressman Hardwick explaining approvingly how proposed constitutional provisions in Georgia
would have the effect of disfranchising all African Americans).
12. Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 297. The concept of canonization, and especially
constitutional canonization, has attracted a fair amount of academic attention. See, e.g., LEGAL
CANONS (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Can-
ons of Constitutional Law, Ill HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998); Pildes, The Canon, supra note t. Despite
this attention, however, scholars have been hard-pressed to settle on a coherent and unitary defini-
tion of the "constitutional canon." "To define the canon," Suzanna Sherry argues, "is to specify the
basic and essential reading materials for students in constitutional law." Suzanna Sherry, The Canon
in Constitutional Law, in LEGAL CANONS, supra, at 374, 381. Texts are "canonical" to constitutional
law, Philip Bobbit writes, when "they are authoritative in our legal and political culture-owing to
their role in defining, exemplifying, or explaining the legitimate methods of constitutional argu-
ment." Philip Bobbit, The Constitutional Canon, in LEGAL CANONS, supra, at 331, 331. Perhaps the
best understanding of the "constitutional canon" is that there are multiple constitutional canons
existing simultaneously. As Balkin and Levinson note, "canons are made by all of us, just as our
ways of thinking are shaped by them in turn." Balkin & Levinson, supra, at 1021. Balkin and Levin-
son give a fair summary in Legal Canons when they note that "legal materials can be canonical
because they are important for educating law students (the pedagogical canon), because they ensure
a necessary cultural literacy for citizens in a democracy (the cultural literacy canon), or because they
serve as benchmarks for testing academic theories about the law (the academic theory canon)." J.M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Canons and Constitutional Thought, in LEGAL CANONS,
supra, at 400, 402. In The Canon, Pildes clearly believes the "constitutional canon" to comprise
cases and materials included in standard law textbooks and understood and discussed by scholars of
constitutional law. See Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 297.
13. See, e.g., Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 297 (noting that most constitutional law
texts omitted the decision entirely before 2000 and that even well-established constitutional law
scholars were not familiar with the case).
14. Id. at 319. By this, Pildes seems to be suggesting that constitutional scholars and those
helping to construct the constitutional canon, see supra note 12, had for much of the twentieth cen-
tury been uninterested in issues of democratic government, and that this disinterest explains in part
why cases such as Giles either failed to enter or were airbrushed from the constitutional canon dur-
ing this period.
15. Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 296.
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Understanding Giles v. Harris
Giles's deeper meaning and historical context, or to marginalize or ignore
the decision altogether.
This Note examines reactions to the Giles decision among both legal
scholars and the public in the immediate aftermath of the case and in the• • 16
two decades following the decision. It argues that after a burst of media
and academic interest immediately following the opinion, in which the dis-
franchising results of the holding received considerable attention, in the
decades following the decision legal scholars gradually came to cite Giles
for three broad and varied propositions, two of which had little to do with
the antidemocratic nature of Holmes's opinion. This Note also argues that
by the mid-1920s some scholars writing about Giles seemed to acknowledge
the antidemocracy aspects of the case only in passing, instead focusing on
doctrinal rules about jurisdiction, equity, separation of powers, and political
questions. Put another way, it appears that during this period there was no
conscious attempt to "airbrush" the decision out of the constitutional canon,
but that gradually some scholars came to view and discuss the case as one
more concerned with procedural technicalities than with the core meaning
of democracy, while others, perhaps more interested in questions of race and
democracy, looked to less procedurally messy cases for teaching tools. This
evolution had the effect of limiting the importance of the Giles decision in
the eyes of scholars-and also in the eyes of practitioners, who did not cite it
for its holdings on voting-and so probably contributed to its exclusion from
constitutional law teaching texts."' Part I of this Note analyzes the Giles case
16. Pildes makes it clear that at least a few legal academics and casebook authors in the latter
part of the twentieth century knew about and wrote about the Giles decision as part of the working
of American antidemocracy. See id..296-97 & nn.9-10 (citing OWEN M. Fiss, TROUBLED BEGIN-
NINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 373 (1993) and DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND
AMERICAN LAW 45-46, 112, 177, 189 n.14 (3d ed. 1992)). The basic premise of Pildes's argument
in The Canon, however, is that by the twenty-first century Giles had largely been airbrushed from
the constitutional canon, isolated examples such as Fiss's work or Bell's work notwithstanding. See
id. at 297. The disappearance of the decision from the constitutional canon (whether it was "air-
brushed" or, as this Note argues, it gradually faded away from the canon as it came to stand for
technical procedural points) largely took place in the two decades following the decision. By the
early 1920s, a number of the most influential legal thinkers of the time (including Charles Warren,
Felix Frankfurter, and James Landis) had come to view the Giles decision as something other than a
critical decision about democratic governance or a critical moment in the history of American de-
mocratic choice. See infra notes 123-125, 139 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Note, The Alabama Franchise Case, 17 HARV. L. REV. 130, 13 1 (1903) (focus-
ing on the procedural rules and concluding that "[o]n analysis, therefore, contrary to what might be
thought, this case does not turn upon a question of constitutional law"); Note, Constitutionality of
the Grandfather Clause, 14 COLUM. L. REV. 336, 337 n.7 (1914) (explaining that Giles was decided
on nonconstitutional grounds).
18. This Note does not fully answer the question of why Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), entered the constitutional canon, but Giles did not. One answer is that Plessy remains in the
canon because of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In other words, normatively
bad decisions may remain interesting because those decisions were overturned by later cases or
events, as Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), for example, was nullified by the
Civil War. Giles, however, was arguably nullified by Baker v. Carr, see supra note 9 and accompa-
nying text, and so might actually form one of these normatively bad/normatively good pairs.
Another possible answer is that Plessy touched on issues of everyday life, whereas Giles touched on
the franchise, which is not implicated on a daily basis. What this Note does demonstrate is that
Giles's absence from the constitutional canon is not attributable to media or academic disinterest in
March 2009]
Michigan Law Review
and Holmes's opinion. Part II examines some popular reactions (primarily in
newspapers) to the case in the two years immediately following the deci-
sion. Part III traces the gradual evolution of Giles in legal and academic
publications from a case about race and voting rights to a case (at least in
the eyes of some scholars) about the technicalities of jurisdiction, equity,
and separation of powers, and the concomitant move by those scholars who
were interested in questions of race and democratic governance away from a
focus on Giles to a focus on similar but procedurally cleaner cases such as
Williams v. Mississippi'
9 and Guinn v. United States.
20
I. THE CASE AND THE DECISION
Today, scholars and historians read Giles in a wide variety of ways: as
an example of the Supreme Court's reluctance to issue orders it was afraid it
could not enforce; 2' as a case "establish[ing] the principle that it is not the
role of the courts to provide relief for political-structural--claims" ;22 as a
situation in which a "cynical and disingenuous" Justice Holmes sought to
avoid confronting a difficult question;2 ' as an indication of Holmes's deep
sense of powerlessness in the face of Southern racism;14 as an example of
how the Court, at the beginning of the twentieth century, interpreted the Re-
construction Amendments in effectively formalistic terms-to the detriment
of African Americans interested in voting, who needed the protections of-
fered by the post-Civil War Congress; 25 or as an example of the Court very
deliberately acting to avoid what it saw as either an insoluble question or a
26political question. The various readings of Giles differ so much in tone in
part because of the complicated procedural posture by which Giles reached
the Supreme Court and the strained nature of Holmes's opinion. This Part
the years immediately following the decision. Similarly, its absence is not even attributable to a
larger academic disinterest in issues of democratic governance. See, e.g., infra notes 119-120 and
accompanying text (describing how an academic focused attention in 1912 and 1914 on Williams v.
Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), as an example of antidemocratic jurisprudence).
19. 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding state constitutional provisions requiring literacy tests
and poll taxes).
20. 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (striking down as unconstitutional "grandfather clause" exceptions
to literacy test requirements).
21. See Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 306; see also Barry Friedman, The Politics of
Judicial Review, 84 TEx. L. REv. 257, 315 (2005).
22. Charles, supra note 7, at 625-26; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and
Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REv. 593, 606-07 (2002).
23. See, e.g., William M. Wiecek, The Emergence of Equality as a Constitutional Value: The
First Century, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 233, 263 (2007).
24. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 16, at 372-79.
25. James W. Fox, Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of Equal
Citizenship in the Era of Jim Crow, 50 How. L.J. 113, 134 (2006).
26. See, e.g., J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER,
1844-1944, at 273, 346-47 (1993) (describing the political background of the case and Booker T.
Washington's influence in bringing the litigation).
[Vol. 107:853
Understanding Giles v. Harris
briefly traces the events that initially superimposed27 the case on U.S. history
and society. Section L.A describes the development of the case; Section I.B
examines and critiques Holmes's opinion.
A. The Development of the Case
Giles began when Jackson Giles, who led an organization in Alabama
(the Colored Men's Suffrage Association) dedicated to retaining the fran-
chise for African Americans, brought a test case before the local federal
court challenging the enfranchisement provisions of the Alabama Constitu-
tion of 1901.28 That constitution, which was proposed and ratified by a racist
and biased group of elite Democrats intent on disfranchising African Ameri-29
cans, created an enormously convoluted bifurcated system of registering
voters. Under this system, voters-all of whom had to pay a poll tax3°-fell
into two groups: there were those (all, or almost all, white) who were quali-
fied to register prior to December 20, 1902, and there were those (generally
nonwhite) who were only qualified to register after December 20, 1902. The
voters in the first group only had to register once, through a system that
made it easy to register, to be qualified to vote for life." The voters in the
second group, however, had to face a system of harshly applied literacy, em-
ployment, and property tests, administered on an election-by-election
32
basis. In other words, the voters in the second group had to overcome far
27. Thus, of course, allowing for what Pildes sees as the later "airbrushing" of Giles from
the constitutional canon.
28. Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 299. Giles's claim was not a random and uncoordi-
nated attack on the new Alabama Constitution: as Pildes points out, the case was secretly funded
and orchestrated by the ostensibly accommodationist Booker T. Washington, and was handled and
briefed by Wilford H. Smith, Washington's personal lawyer. Id. at 304-05.
29. See, e.g., id. at 299-303. Southern legislators seeking to craft constitutional and statutory
hurdles to disfranchise nonwhites were not reticent about what they were attempting to accomplish.
See supra note 11.
30. ALA. CONST. of 1901, § 178.
31. Under this permissive regime, those permitted to register included all those who had
served honorably in the U.S. military in the War of 1812, the war with Mexico, any war with the
Indians, the Civil War, or the Spanish-American War, or who had served in the confederacy, along
with the "lawful descendants" of those who had served in these conflicts. Id. § 180. As most non-
whites in Alabama had not served-or been allowed to serve-in either the U.S. or the Confederate
military, this rule excluded a large proportion of the African American community. Under the per-
missive regime, all those of "good character" who "understand the duties and obligations of
citizenship under a republican form of government" were also permitted to register. Given the
avowed intent of the Alabama Constitutional Convention of 1901 to prevent African Americans from
voting, it is no surprise that the registrars found that few nonwhites had the requisite understanding
of good government. Id.
32. After January 1, 1903, those permitted to register included both owners of extensive
property and those who could pass a literacy test. The State Constitution identified these individuals
as:
[t]hose who can read and write any article of the Constitution of the United States in the English
language, and who are physically unable to work; and those who can read and write any article of
the Constitution of the United States in the English language, and who have worked or been
regularly engaged in some lawful employment, business or occupation, trade or calling for the
March 20091
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greater hurdles than did the voters in the first group-and had to do so again
and again, any time they wished to vote. The voting system worked just as
the framers had intended: in Alabama, of the 181,471 eligible African
American voters in 1900, only 3000 were registered under the new consti-
tutional provisions.33
In his complaint to the federal court, Giles, speaking for himself and pu-
tatively speaking on behalf of 5000 other African Americans in his county,
claimed that the voter registration provisions of the Alabama constitution
violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Giles asked in his suit
that the provisions be declared unconstitutional and that he be enrolled to
vote in Alabama elections. Before holding a trial on the merits of Giles's
claim, however, Federal Circuit Judge Thomas G. Jones concluded that the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction, presumably because Giles had not met the
$2,000 "amount in controversy" requirement mandated by federal statute.34
Under federal law, circuit judges concluding that they lacked jurisdiction
could "certify" the question of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.35 At the
urging of Wilford Smith, Giles's attorney, Judge Jones did so, and the case
proceeded to the Supreme Court for consideration of this sole question.36
B. Justice Holmes's Opinion
In his opinion for the Court, Holmes brushed past a number of proce-
dural hurdles to reach the merits of the case, and in doing so effectively
destroyed the hopes of African Americans who believed that the federal
courts would step in to prevent Southern states from acting in ostensibly
neutral ways to remove nonwhites from the voting rolls.
Holmes began by dismissing the mootness argument that federal courts
had generally used to avoid deciding cases alleging that citizens had been
wrongfully disfranchised.37 Insomuch as Giles had officially asked to be
enrolled as a voter in the congressional election of 1902, and as that election
greater part of the twelve months next preceding the time they offer to register; and those who
are unable to read and write, if such inability is due solely to physical disability.
Id. § 181. Not surprisingly, the Alabama officials tasked with administering the literacy and em-
ployment tests tended to use their discretion to exclude nonwhites. One tactic-which appears to
have been the one that excluded Giles himself from voting-was to require the testimony of whites
as to the previous year of employment and residency.
33. Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 303-04.
34. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 485 (1903).
35. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, sec. 5, 26 Stat. 826, 827 ("In any case in which the juris-
diction of the court is in issue; in such cases the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to
the Supreme Court from the court below for decision."); Heckman, supra note 3, at 627.
36. See Transcript of Record, supra note 3, at 407-08. Because the Court was only supposed
to be concerned with the jurisdictional question, the case proceeded to judgment on the basis of
briefs alone, without oral argument. Giles, 189 U.S. at 494 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Alabama Suffrage Provisions Are to Come Up in the Supreme Court, CHARLOTrE DAILY OBSERVER,
(Charlotte, N.C.), Nov. IH, 1902, at I ("The question of jurisdiction is the principal point involved in
the case and there will be no oral argument . .
37. Giles, 189 U.S. at 484.
[Vol. 107:853
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had passed by the time the case got to the Supreme Court, the Court could
have ruled that the question was moot and the case no longer relevant. 3' This
is the path the Court had followed in the past in Mills v. Green, 9 and would
follow again-at least until 1969, when the Court in Moore v. Ogilvie ex-
tended the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine to voting
rights.4n Instead, however, Holmes announced that the Court was not willing
to take this step, as "to be enabled to cast a vote in that election ... is not
even the principal object of the relief sought by the plaintiff.' 4' As Charles
Heckman notes, Holmes was being somewhat disingenuous here: while
Holmes distinguished Giles from Mills on these grounds, in fact "voting in
any one election was not the object of the litigation in Mills any more than it
was in Giles," and so Holmes was "distinguishing without a difference"-
albeit while "getting to the real issue. 42
After dismissing the seemingly valid mootness claim, Holmes consid-
ered and dismissed in quick succession three jurisdictional challenges:
(1) the amount-in-controversy question; (2) the fact that the statute purport-
edly granting jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear cases involving the
abrogation of Fourteenth Amendment rights specified that such violations be
included in a "statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage"-and did not
specify a state constitution; and (3) the fact that the lower court had certified
to the Supreme Court only the question of jurisdiction, and no question on
the merits. 43 As to the amount-in-controversy claim-that Giles had not
specified that he had suffered damages in excess of $2,000-Holmes con-
cluded that because the state had not objected on the grounds that Giles had
failed to meet the amount-in-controversy claim, the Supreme Court could
consider the case." As to the claim that the enabling statute did not specifi-
cally list state constitutions as documents giving rise to federal lower-court
jurisdiction, Holmes concluded simply that the Court was "not prepared" to
say that the subject matter was "wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the circuit
court," and so the Supreme Court would not deny jurisdiction on these
grounds. 5 As to the certification claim, Holmes concluded that "as the
ground of the bill is that the Constitution of Alabama is in contravention of
38. See, e.g., Heckman, supra note 3, at 636-37.
39. 159 U.S. 651 (1895) (finding a voting rights suit moot because the election in which the
plaintiff wished to vote had passed).
40. 394 U.S. 814 (1969); see also Heckman, supra note 3, at 637. The "capable of repetition,
yet evading review" doctrine was first applied in Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Com-
merce Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
41. Giles, 189 U.S. at 484; see also Heckman, supra note 3, at 636.
42. Heckman, supra note 3, at 636. Heckman adds that "[a]lthough Holmes may deserve
some lumps for writing the Giles opinion, he ought to receive a good deal of credit for this holding."
Id. at 636-37.
43. Giles, 189 U.S. at 484-86.
44. Id. at 485.
45. Id. at 485-86.
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the Constitution of the United States, the appeal opens the whole case.
' 46
Justice Holmes's rationales for disposing of the jurisdictional claims, as
Justices Harlan and Brewer noted in dissent, were surprising and perhaps
inconsistent with Court doctrine. 47 Holmes, it seems clear, was quite inter-
ested in getting to the merits of the decision, and viewed the jurisdictional
issues as obstacles rather than opportunities for the Court to duck a difficult
question.
Having disposed of the jurisdictional questions, Holmes turned to the
merits of the case, and with two swift strokes seemed to close off much of
Jackson Giles's hope for judicial protection. In his first move, which Pildes
calls "the most legally disingenuous analysis in the pages of the U.S. Re-
ports, ' and which Rebecca Scott calls "a breathtaking Catch-22, 49 Holmes
concluded that the Court could not grant relief even if the Justices assumed
that all of Giles's complaints were substantially correct.5° If the Court made
this assumption, and proceeded with the understanding that the provisions
of the 1901 Alabama Constitution did violate the U.S. Constitution, then the
Court could not provide relief because it could have no part in sustaining an
unconstitutional voting scheme. "If, then, we accept the conclusion which it
is the chief purpose of the bill to maintain," Holmes asked rhetorically, "how
can we make the court a party to the unlawful scheme by accepting it and
adding another voter to its fraudulent lists?"'" In other words, because Giles
was alleging that the provisions of the state constitution were unconstitu-
tional, the Court could do nothing to provide Giles any relief from the
allegedly unconstitutional provisions. Giles, as Holmes knew, could not
have escaped from this logical trap by not asking to be placed on the voting
rolls-for, as Holmes acknowledged, Giles "could not maintain a bill for a
mere declaration in the air.
' '52
In his second move in deciding the merits, Holmes focused on the seem-
ingly more pragmatic question of whether anything the Court did would
have an impact on a truly racist voting system in Alabama. "If the conspir-
acy and the intent exist, a name on a piece of paper will not defeat them," he
concluded.53 "Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that state by
officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from
46. Id. at 486.
47. See, e.g., id. at 498 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("That is a new, and I take leave to say, a star-
tling, doctrine."); see also Heckman, supra note 3, at 631 (discussing Holmes's conclusion that the fact
that a court had not previously noticed a party's failure to plead lack of amount-in-controversy meant
that the court could fail to notice it again). "This kind of [legal analysis] is nonsense," Heckman
wrote, "and Holmes knew nonsense when he saw it." Id.
48. Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 306.
49. ScoTr, supra note 3, at 321 n.17.
50. Giles, 189 U.S. at 486-87.
51. Id. at 486.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 488.
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equity would be an empty form." In summarizing this point, Holmes ex-
plained that the difficulty the Court would have in enforcing the rule
"strikingly reinforces the argument that equity cannot undertake now, any
more than it has in the past, to enforce political rights."55 Put another way,
Holmes concluded that the Court, sitting in equity, would not decide a ques-
tion of political rights precisely because plaintiffs might well have no
nonjudicial means of enforcing those rights in the aftermath of any decision.
Perhaps the most interesting element of the Giles decision was Holmes's
claim that the Court could not accomplish anything by finding for Jackson
Giles because, as Pildes demonstrates, Holmes was basing his argument on
an assumption that he could or should have known was entirely incorrect.
56
Holmes's approach to Giles makes more sense if observers assume that
whites in Alabama were already united in a conspiracy to disfranchise non-
whites, and were willing to go to any lengths necessary to achieve this
disfranchisement. In fact, the population of Alabama was not divided neatly
along racial lines, and single-race, single-party domination of the South was
far from certain.57 The population of Alabama was, rather, deeply divided
along class, political, and socioeconomic lines.58 As Pildes explains in The
Canon,
[T]he framers of disfranchisement were typically the most conservative,
large landowning, wealthy faction of the Democratic Party, who were also
seeking to entrench their partisan power and fend off challenges from
Republicans, Populists, and other third parties, as well as from the more
populist wings of the Democratic Party. While pledging not to disfranchise
any whites, they advocated provisions that would remove the less edu-
cated, less organized, more impoverished whites from the electorate as
well-and that would ensure one-party, Democratic rule, which is pre-
cisely what happened from this moment forward through most of the 20th
century in the South.59
54. Id.
55. Id. at 487.
56. See Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 301; Pildes, Meaningful, supra note 3, at 645-46.
57. See Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 301; Pildes, Meaningful, supra note 3, at 645-46;
Negroes Indignant, N.Y TRIB., Apr. 28, 1903, at 1 (describing the reaction to the Giles decision in
Birmingham, Alabama). According to the New York Tribune, which was reporting on the basis of tele-
graphed information, "[t]he negroes," "indignant" about the decision and, uncertain as to what action to
take, were planning a meeting at which they claimed "as many white men will be present as there are
negroes." Negroes Indignant, supra. Reinforcing the concept of Alabama politics as not yet simply
divided along racial lines, the newspaper's correspondent concluded that "[tihe outlook is that the
Republicans of the State are on the verge of another great split .... It is said that... '[l]ily White'
leaders will be read out of the party." Id.
58. See Pildes, Meaningful, supra note 3, at 645-46; Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 301
("For those who mistakenly believe in the inevitability of white supremacy in this period, the key
word here is 'slowly'; it took several years of the self-conscious construction and organized mobili-
zation of a militarized white supremacy, often against a divided white business community willing
to accommodate black political participation for the sake of stability, to enable white 'redemption'
of the South.").
59. Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 302; see also Pildes, Meaningful, supra note 3, at
645-46 ("A generation after the turbulence of this era, though, the comprehensive regime of white
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In other words, had Holmes actually faced down the supporters of the
Alabama Constitution of 1901, then the Court might actually have prevented
the disfranchisement about which Jackson Giles was complaining. Holmes's
words were at least in part self-fulfilling;6 Giles permitted the creation of
the single-party, single-race domination of the Alabama political system that
Holmes assumed already existed, and so meant that from that moment on
Holmes's logic would have made more sense.
Given Holmes's determination to avoid the jurisdictional question and
reach the merits, Giles has to be read, at least in part, as a definitive message
from the Supreme Court putting the members of the African American
community of the South on notice that they could not count on the judiciary
to protect their rights. In his decision, Holmes left only one possible open-
ing-the suggestion that Giles could sue the state for damages, and so make
a legal, rather than an equitable claim. The next year, however, the state and
federal courts closed this possibility off as well, when the Supreme Court in
Giles v. Teasley held that it had no jurisdiction to hear Giles's damages
claim6-a claim which had been rejected by the Alabama Supreme Court
on grounds that kept the case out of federal hands by avoiding federal ques-
tions or constitutional issues.62
II. POPULAR (MEDIA) REACTION TO THE GILEs DECISION
This Part examines some of the popular media coverage and editorials
that immediately followed the Giles and Teasley decisions and argues that
this coverage and these editorials, whether positive or negative and in both
the northern and southern papers, focused heavily on the democ-
racy/antidemocracy aspects of Holmes's decision. If media coverage
63determines in part what cases enter the canon of constitutional law, then
supremacy had emerged. So, too, had one party political monopolization of Southern politics, in the
form of the Democratic Party. Blacks had been eliminated from politics and socially segregated.
Because this regime endured until the modem civil rights era, it is easy to think its reign natural and
inevitable. But this regime emerged through the struggles of this era; it had to be self-consciously
constructed, brick by brick, year by year, in conflicts with opposing white factions close to equi-
poise, in battles whose outcome was often in doubt.").
60. See, e.g., ScoTr, supra note 3, at 197 ("Disfranchisement by state constitution, begun as
a clear challenge to federal authority, encompassing provisions that even some of its strongest pro-
ponents expected to see turned back by the courts, was in 1903-1904 accorded the respect of an
inevitable expression of the will of the 'people of the state.'").
61. 193 U.S. 146 (1904). In Teasley, Jackson Giles brought suit for damages in the Alabama
state courts. Given Holmes's suggestion that damages might lie in such a claim, it is not clear why
Giles did not refile his suit in the federal courts. In considering the case, the Alabama Supreme
Court (using Holmes's logic from Giles) reached its decision without depending primarily on a
federal question and so cut off the U.S. Supreme Court's possibility of review.
62. Rebecca Scott suggests in Degrees of Freedom that at least one southern state official
(the Louisiana attorney general) was waiting for the Teasley decision before acting on a filed lawsuit
and moved to protect the new voting provisions of his own state within a week of the decision.
ScoTr, supra note 3, at 195.
63. For more on how cases and materials enter the constitutional canon, see supra note 12.
Heavy media scrutiny of a particular case, like heavy academic scrutiny of a particular case (as
Pildes scrutinized Giles), could presumably help propel that case into the constitutional canon by
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the reporting in 1903 and 1904 could easily have helped Giles do so. The
case was big news for many in the United States, and the media coverage
seemingly set the stage nicely for continuing academic and scholarly inter-
est in the decision-though for some reason that interest failed to
materialize. Section II.A examines how in the immediate aftermath of the
decision newspapers from multiple places on the political and judicial spec-
trum clearly identified, in both ostensibly neutral reportage and more
partisan editorializing, the link between the case and the constitutional im-
plications of a decision preventing African Americans from voting. Section
II.B describes how some newspapers went even further, actually reveling in
the link between Giles and constitutional, legal racism. Section II.C argues
that despite the falloff in coverage about Giles after 1904, the media's re-
sponse to the case in 1903 and 1904 suggests that newspapers were not in
any way interested in airbrushing the case from the constitutional scene.64
A. Identifying the Link Between Giles and Antidemocracy
In the immediate aftermath of the Giles decision, national news reports,
newspapers critical of the decision, and newspapers strongly supporting the
decision all quickly made the connection between Giles and the question of
African American enfranchisement-essentially identifying the link be-
tween Giles and antidemocracy.
The first surviving public reactions to and interpretations of Giles came
in national, fairly objective news reports (rather than editorials) published in
numerous small papers around the country. While it remains unclear exactly
how closely various communities were watching the Court as it made its
bringing it to the attention of canon-defining law professors, legal scholars and observers, and cur-
rent and future law students. This Note does not argue that media attention is necessary before a
case can enter the canon, or even that for the case to remain in the canon it was necessary for the
public to learn by reading media reports not only that Giles had bad normative results for African
Americans but also that Giles was an important case with antidemocratic elements. Instead, this
Note argues that even if Pildes is correct that Giles was airbrushed from the canon-and that pre-
sumably somebody or something actively engaged in airbrushing-then (1) it was not the
newspaper reporters and editors writing in the aftermath of the case who did so, and (2) it would
have been hard for anyone else to do so while the newspapers continued to focus in such a noisy
manner on the democratic/antidemocratic importance of the decision. See also infra Section II.C.
64. It is of course unclear whether the news reporters or editors writing about Giles intended
to make the case an important symbol in either the canon of democracy or the canon of antidemoc-
racy. What is clear, however, is that these reporters and editors thought it important to talk about the
democratic/antidemocratic elements of the decision. History is rife with examples of individuals
disingenuously ignoring the democratic or antidemocratic implications of court decisions. See, e.g.,
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) ("We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the col-
ored race with a badge of inferiority."). History is also rife with examples of reporters choosing not
to write about particular topics because of concerns about national security, propriety, or the appear-
ance of the United States in the eyes of the world. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT
KENNEDY AND His TIMES 362-65 (Mariner Books 2002) (1978) (noting that "[tlhe refusal of news-
papers to touch" audio tapes of sexual orgies engaged in by Martin Luther King, Jr., "attests to the
standards of decency the press observed in those forgotten days"). Had they, or their readers, been
interested in, for whatever reason, airbrushing Giles from the constitutional canon, these reporters
and editors could have held off from writing extensively about the democracy/antidemocracy impli-
cations of the opinion, and instead either mourned or celebrated the decision off the front pages.
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decision in Giles, contemporary newspaper accounts suggest that the case
was an item of intense interest in a number of southern states, including
Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, 6' and was of general
66
interest in some northern and western states as well. On April 28, 1903, the
day after the decision was announced, for instance, a number of newspapers
in communities as distant as Columbus, Georgia; Columbia, South Carolina;
Boise, Idaho; Aberdeen, South Dakota; Washington, D.C.; Chicago, Illinois;
and San Francisco, California published nearly identical stories about the
Court's decision.67 According to the stories, which essentially contained a
summary of the Court's decision, the case "was brought to test the validity
of the portion of the state constitution bearing upon [the] question," and
"[tihe relief sought was denied on the ground that the case was political. 68
As this summary and other news accounts from the period demonstrate,
contemporary observers were well aware of the link between the Giles deci-
sion and the normative question of African American voting rights and
disfranchisement.69
Not surprisingly, the newspapers that editorialized strongly against
Holmes's decision in Giles were even more explicit than were the authors of
ostensibly objective news stories in describing the connection between the
Giles litigation and the disfranchisement of African Americans in southern
states. These newspapers were far less likely than were those in favor of the
65. See, e.g., Alabama Suffrage Provisions Are to Come Up in the Supreme Court, CHARLOTrFE
DAILY OBSERVER (Charlotte, N.C.), Nov. 11, 1902, at 1; Alabama's Constitution, STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Feb. 25, 1903, at 1; And StillAnother, PLANET (Richmond, Va.), May 9, 1903, at 4; EdwardM.
Shepard's Defense of the South's Suffrage Laws: From the New York Evening Post, STATE (Columbia,
S.C.), Aug. 31, 1903, at 10 (reprinted from the New York Evening Post). The case was obviously of
particular interest to Alabama, as it concerned the constitutionality of the Alabama Constitution of
1901. See, e.g., Negroes Indignant, N.Y. TRIB, Apr. 28, 1903, at I (reporting, on the basis of tele-
graphed information from Birmingham, Alabama, that "the negroes are indignant at the Supreme
Court for deciding the franchise case against them, and are at a loss as to what action to take").
66. See, e.g., Against Negro Voters, N.Y TRIB., Apr. 28, 1903, at 1; Colored Voter Loses
Suffrage: Supreme Court Upholds Ruling of Southern Registrars, S.F. CALL, Apr. 28, 1903, at 2.
67. See, e.g., Relief is Denied Jackson W. Giles: Alabama Negro Who Wanted to Register and
Vote Under New Constitution, COLUMBUS ENQUIRER-SUN (Columbus, Ga.), Apr. 28, 1903, at 7;
Alabama's Franchise Clause: Supreme Court of the United States Dismisses the Petition of a Negro
Refused Registration, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Apr. 28, 1903, at 5; Supreme Court Decision:
Refuses to Interfere in Alabama Case Because It Is Political, IDAHO DAILY STATESMAN (Boise,
Idaho), Apr. 28, 1903, at 1; No Relief is Given: Supreme Court and the New Alabama Constitution,
ABERDEEN DAILY NEWS (Aberdeen, S.D.), Apr. 28, 1903, at 2; Negro Denied Relief: Court Declines
to Pass on an Alabama Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1903, at 4; Negro Voter Denied Relief- United
States Supreme Court Refuses to Decide Case Affecting New Registration Law in Alabama, CHI.
DAILY TRIB., Apr. 28, 1903, at 3; Colored Voter Loses Suffrage: Supreme Court Upholds Ruling of
Southern Registrars, S.F. CALL, Apr. 28, 1903, at 2.
68. E.g., Negro Denied Relief: Court Declines to Pass on an Alabama Case, WASH. POST,
Apr. 28, 1903, at 4; Negro Voter Denied Relief: United States Supreme Court Refuses to Decide
Case Affecting New Registration Law in Alabama, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 28, 1903, at 3; No Relief
is Given: Supreme Court and the New Alabama Constitution, ABERDEEN DAILY NEWS (Aberdeen,
S.D.), Apr. 28, 1903, at 2.
69. Not all news accounts, however, focused on the democratic governance aspects of the
case. See, e.g., Alabama Suffrage Provisions Are to Come Up in the Supreme Court, CHARLOTrE
DAILY OBSERVER (Charlotte, N.C.), Nov. 11, 1902, at I ("The question of jurisdiction is the princi-
pal point involved in the case and there will be no oral argument....").
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outcome to view the Court's decision as a necessary and pragmatic move by
a powerless Supreme Court. 70 Especially notable among publications con-
demning the decision were those publications affiliated with African
American communities, such as The Journal, an African American paper
published in Huntsville, Alabama, and The Planet, an African American
newspaper published in Richmond, Virginia. In the aftermath of the deci-
sion, The Planet was particularly critical, deriding the Supreme Court's
conclusion that the Court should decline to do equity if it is believed that it
could not enforce equity.2 "Colored men, we shall come again," declared
The Planet, "but it will be with religion, intelligence and money to back our
demands and to enforce a favorable decision from the Supreme Court of the
United States. 73
Despite the critiques in papers such as The Planet, however, the publica-
tions that seemed to devote the most time and space to the Giles case-and
that also, in editorials, strongly highlighted the link between Giles and anti-
democracy-were those that saw the decision as representing good judicial
philosophy or even laudable racial discrimination. Publications as widely var-
ied as The Sun (now the New York Sun), the New York Evening Post, the
Philadelphia Public Ledger, and Harper's Weekly devoted significant space to
the story.74 The case was apparently so well known in some circles that publi-
cations such as Harper's Weekly could refer to it simply as "the Alabama
case," without confusion.7 ' These publications, in addition to elaborating on
the racial and racist normative outcomes of the decision, focused intently on
the constitutional and federalism implications of Holmes's opinion. The• - 76
Democratic-leaning Harper's Weekly, for example, published an editorial
70. See, e.g., Louis G. Gregory, Editorial, Giles Suffrage Case: E.M. Shepard's Defense of
the Action of the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 1903, at 9 (responding to a case made in the
New York Evening Post in favor of Holmes's decision).
71. See, e.g., And Still Another, PLANET (Richmond, Va.), May 9, 1903, at 4; The Negro Is
Persistent, JOURNAL (Huntsville, Ala.), Sept. 11, 1902; To Test State Constitution, JOURNAL (Huntsville,
Ala.), Nov. 6, 1902.
72. And StillAnother, PLANET (Richmond, Va.), May 9, 1903, at 4.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Edward M. Shepard's Defense of the South's Suffrage Laws: From the New York
Evening Post, STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Aug. 31, 1903, at 10 (reprinted from the New York Evening
Post); Recent Views of the Fifteenth Amendment, 47 HARPER'S WEEKLY 873, 873 (May 23, 1903)
(collecting commentary from the Philadelphia Public Ledger and the New York Sun). At the same
time, however, there was almost no coverage of the Giles decision in some major northern papers
such as the New York limes, and there was very little in papers such as the Chicago Tribune. See
supra note 68.
75. See Recent Views of the Fifteenth Amendment, 47 HARPER'S WEEKLY 873 (May 23,
1903).
76. Of course, the Democratic Party of the early twentieth century bore little resemblance to
the Democratic Party of the latter part of the twentieth century. Between the end of Reconstruction
and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the "Solid
South" gave its full electoral support to the Democratic Party, which responded by placing many of
the levers of power in the hands of racist, southern legislators. See, e.g., DEWEY W. GRANTHAM,
THE LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SOLID SOUTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY (1992). In addition to being the
party of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, at least until the flight of the Dixiecrats in 1948,
the Democratic Party during this period was therefore also the party of Jim Crow and racial
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suggesting that the case helped indicate that northerners would come to un-
derstand that the Fifteenth Amendment should be repealed." The
Philadelphia Public Ledger, meanwhile, praised the Giles decision as one in
which the Supreme Court demonstrated that it was "a fountain of equity,"
and Harper's Weekly summarized the Ledger's analysis as follows:
The Public Ledger went on to recognize that there has been awakened in
the public consciousness a suspicion that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments may have been measures of uncertain wisdom, added to the
Constitution without due deliberation upon their consequences, and that it
might have been better to leave the determination of the question treated in
those amendments, the question, namely, of negro suffrage, to the several
States. It sees that, within very recent years, the most thoughtful citizens at
the North have been tending to the conclusion that the South may and
should be trusted to deal wisely and honorably with a problem which to
them is far more momentous than it is to the rest of the republic. It is well
said by the Public Ledger that the general prevalence of this conviction
may be said to constitute a sort of unwritten amendment to the Federal
Constitution, and that it was in accordance with this unwritten amendment
that the Supreme Court declined to allow Federal tribunals to decide
whether or not Alabama's suffrage laws are in conflict with the negro-
suffrage amendment."
B. Reveling in the Link Between Giles and Racism
In the months and years immediately following the decision, some
newspapers-those whose editors approved of the Giles decision-not only
highlighted the link between Giles and the constitutional canon, but in fact
seemed to go much further by reveling in the link between Giles and official
racism. Far from being anxious to shuffle this case off to the side, or air-
brush it from the constitutional scenery, these newspapers repeatedly
focused on the constitutional implications of the decision.
Racist opinions on the case did not break evenly along North-South
lines, or even Democratic-Republican lines. The New York-based
Democratic-leaning Harper's Weekly, for instance, strongly sided with
Holmes's opinion, and approvingly summarized seemingly racist coverage
from both the Republican-affiliated New York Sun and the Republican-
affiliated Philadelphia Public Ledger.9 "That the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the Alabama case would be viewed with
satisfaction in the Southern States was to be expected," noted Harper's
segregation. Cf JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-1974, at
560-61 (1996) (observing that Lyndon Johnson's support for the Civil Rights movement led to the
decline of support for the Democratic Party in the South).
77. Recent Discussion of the Fifteenth Amendment, 47 HARPER'S WEEKLY 1144 (July 11,
1903).
78. Recent Views of the Fifteenth Amendment, 47 HARPER'S WEEKLY 873, 873 (May 23,
1903) (summarizing analysis from the Philadelphia Public Ledger).
79. Id. at 873-74 (collecting commentary on Giles and against African American suffrage
from the Philadelphia Public Ledger and the New York Sun).
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Weekly. "It is a more significant and, to some extent, a surprising fact that the
decision also meets with approval at the North on the part, not only of many
non-partisan newspapers, but also of some Republican organs of undisputed
authority and wide influence."' This "approval" for the decision by
newspapers such as the New York Sun clearly extended to racist
conclusions:
To the question why [the Sun] characterized as "hasty" the policy which
invested the emancipated males of African descent with the full right of
suffrage, it has replied that the term "hasty" seemed to be the right word
for the sudden and wholesale extension of the suffrage, less than four years
after the end of the civil war, to millions of people whose capacity for the
responsibilities of the ballot was then untried, was exceedingly problem-
atical in view of race characteristics, and has since, by a generation's
experience, been absolutely proved not to have existed.8'
Harper's Weekly itself seemed devoted to the sort of racial ideology that
had governed the white elites who crafted the Alabama constitutional voting
provisions. Writing in July of 1903, the editors noted that they were "not
among those who [held] that a repeal of the Fifteenth Amendment... would
be practicable at the present time."82 Such a repeal, they explained, needed to
be considered at greater length: "Only through discussion is it possible that
Northern citizens should arrive at a sober second thought concerning the
matter."3 Of particular concern, the editors added, were the opinions of citi-
zens of the northern states-opinions that the editors were certain would
change once northerners realized how bad African Americans truly were.
Nothing but the growing frequency in the Northern States of the new negro
crime, by which is meant the crime against white women, and the convic-
tion that this crime is due to the notion of political and social equality
implanted by the gift of the suffrage, is likely to cause such a revolution of
Northern sentiment as to lead to the wholesale disfranchisement of the
blacks on the ground of their race or color. 4
While the coverage in Harper's Weekly and the New York Sun demon-
strated that some "northern" papers responded to Giles in racialized or racist
ways, southern papers (not associated with the African American community)
provided such racialized coverage as a matter of course. Quite typical was the
story published in the Columbus Enquirer-Sun of Columbus, Georgia, in
October of 1903 describing Giles's attempt to sue for damages in the Alabama
state courts: "Again Alabama negroes are trying to pick flaws in Alabama's
80. Id. at 873.
81. Id. at 874. "Our readers will not be surprised to learn," added Harper's Weekly, "that
these expressions of opinion on the part of a Republican newspaper have been reproduced and anno-
tated all over the Southern States." Id.






new State Constitution," the paper noted. "It is not very likely that [Giles]
will be successful .... The Alabama constitution will, in all probability,
stand until the white people of the State decide to change it."5
C. Remaining in the Constitutional Picture
The reaction of media outlets in the months and years following Giles
suggests that reporters and editors were interested in focusing on the link
between the Giles decision and ideas of democratic governance or anti-
democracy, and therefore were not interested in wiping that link from the
constitutional scenery.
Not surprisingly, coverage of Giles trickled off in the weeks (or, in the
16case of publications such as Harper's Weekly, months) after the decision.
The spurt of new coverage the next year following the Court's decision in
Teasley similarly diminished quickly.s7 In part, this was probably due to the
nature of news-Giles had been decided, and the papers presumably found
enough going on in 1903 and 1904 (including the election of President
Theodore Roosevelt to his first full term in office) to cover. In part, however,
85. COLUMBUS ENQUIRER-SUN (Columbus, Ga.), Oct. 21, 1903, at4.
86. But see Congressman Hardwick Appeals to Georgians, COLUMBUS ENQUIRER-SUN
(Columbus, Ga.), Sept. 25, 1908, at 1 (quoting Hardwick discussing Giles in an attempt to convince
Georgians to approve constitutional provisions designed to lead to African American disfranchise-
ment). Hardwick's citation of Giles in this address demonstrates how white racist southern
politicians could rely upon Holmes's "political question" reasoning to prevent federal courts from
becoming involved despite the open desire of such politicians to remove African Americans from
the electorate:
It is, I believe, generally and clearly understood that the purpose and object of the amendment
is to disenfranchise the largest number possible ... of the ignorant and venal negro voters of
Georgia and at the same time preserve the ballot to every honest white man in this state. I
should be insincere and far from candid if I did not readily concede as much.... [T]his meas-
ure means no more and no less than "negro disfranchisement."
Id.
87. See, e.g., Negro Suffrage in Court, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 1903, at 13; Negro Case in
Supreme Court, CHARLOTTE DAILY OBSERVER (Charlotte, N.C.), Jan. 6, 1904, at 1; Negro Suffrage
Case: Argument on Alabama Suits Before Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1904, at 9; An Im-
portant Decision, MACON TELEGRAPH (Macon, Ga.), Feb. 28, 1904, at 4 ("As the supreme court of
the United States has again declined to interfere, it will probably be some time before further at-
tempts are made to test the legality of the franchise restrictions adopted in certain of the Southern
states."); "A Republican Form of Government", WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1904, at ES6. News organiza-
tions also covered the run-up to the Supreme Court's decision. See, e.g., Double Tracking Southern,
CHARLOTTE DAILY OBSERVER (Charlotte, N.C.), May 30, 1903, at 1 (noting that the Supreme
Court's decision in Giles "has not ended the fight to test the validity of those disfranchising laws
directed at the ignorant blacks in the South."); Giles Has Another Chance, WORLD-HERALD (Omaha,
Neb.), May 30, 1903, at 3; Negro Suffrage Case, COLORED Am. (Washington, D.C.), Jan. 9, 1904, at
1 (describing the oral argument in Teasley and concluding that "[w]ithout indulgence in fulsome
praise or flattery it may be conceded that no better presentation of the case of the disfranchised
Negro could have been made than the earnest eloquent and forceful argument offered"); Supreme
Court Decisions, SUN (New York, NY), Oct. 20, 1903, at 4 (describing a request by Giles's counsel
asking for three cases involving Alabama's "Grandfather" clause to be consolidated).
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the lack of ongoing coverage of Giles or Teasley might have been due to the
finality of the decisions and the lack of any ongoing topic for argument.
8
Despite the falloff in coverage, however, there was no concomitant at-
tempt by newspapers in 1903 and 1904 to airbrush Giles from the
constitutional canon; if anything, the newspapers reveled in the front-row
place Giles immediately assumed in the American constitutional picture.
While in Giles and Teasley the Court arguably slammed the door on any
attempt by African Americans to protect their right to vote in the courts, the
publications that covered the case, whatever their political stances, had gen-
erally made clear the connection between the decisions and African
American disfranchisement. In 1903 and 1904, there appears to have been
little question but that Giles stood for the proposition that states could rig
suffrage requirements to exclude nonwhites. If Richard Pildes is correct that
by the late twentieth century Giles had been "airbrushed out of the constitu-
tional canon,"89 then that airbrushing did not occur in the media in the
immediate aftermath of the decision, and must have occurred after at least
some observers had identified the decision as a focal point of Pildes's anti-
democracy.
III. SCHOLARLY ANALYSIS AND CATEGORIZATION
With the disappearance of Giles and Teasley from newsprint after 1903
and 1904, the continuing meaning and importance of Giles over the follow-
ing two decades were largely defined in and by the legal treatises,
practitioner handbooks, and academic articles published after the decision
was first handed down. 9° This Part argues that between 1903 and the mid-
1920s scholars discussing Giles generally categorized the case under one of
three broad headings: (1) as a case (possibly a minor case) involving central
questions of disfranchisement, racism, and anti-democracy; (2) as a case es-
tablishing or reinforcing the rule that courts sitting in equity cannot decide
political questions (and so making a separation-of-powers argument); 9' or
88. Cf ScoTr, supra note 3, at 196 ("The strategy of judicial challenge had, in effect,
reached a dead end. With the U.S. Supreme Court categorically on record in the Giles cases, there
was no point in appealing [other decisions] further.").
89. Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 297.
90. Cases enter the constitutional canon not only because of public reception or historical
context, but also in large part because of ongoing judicial interest in citing back to earlier decisions,
and because of the treatment of cases by scholars and authors of legal textbooks and treatises.
Judges, it appears, were not particularly eager to cite Giles for any proposition; according to
Westlaw's "citing references" function, as of November 14, 2008, Giles was cited by judges in only
ninety-nine reported cases, of which only around one quarter were cases before the Supreme Court.
In contrast, according to Westlaw's "citing references" function, by the same date Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), a critical Supreme Court opinion decided two years after Giles, has been
cited in almost seven hundred decisions. Most of the references to Giles, moreover, are glancing,
and make no mention of its importance as a case linked to legalized racial disfranchisement. If Giles
was going to enter Pildes's "canon of (anti-)democracy," it was the legal and constitutional scholars
who would have had to put it there.
91. See, e.g., 8 AM. TECHNICAL SOC'Y, LIBRARY OF AMERICAN LAW AND PRACTICE 102 n.11
(1919); GEORGE L. CLARK, EQUITY: ILLINOIS EDITION 320 n.9 (1920); 1 JOHN NORTON POMEROY,
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(3) as a case establishing technical procedural points92 (and nonconstitutional
points) about jurisdiction or equity.9' While in the years after the decision a
number of scholars who viewed Giles as falling into the first of these cate-
gories produced articles and treatises that could easily have won the case an
enduring place in the constitutional canon, at the same time commentators
and legal scholars who viewed the case as falling into one of the latter two
categories increasingly used Giles to reinforce or illustrate points about ju-
risdiction or political questions. By the 1920s, therefore, some constitutional
scholars apparently viewed Giles as a case about the technicalities of equity,
jurisdiction, or separation of powers,94 while others regarded the case simply
as a minor example of the linkage between jurisprudence and democratic
governance, and only a few held the case out as a critical example of how
court decisions affected the core meaning of democracy.9 In examining the
canon of democracy or even the canon of antidemocracy, some of those• • •96
scholars who viewed the case as being less than critically important instead
focused attention on cleaner, more straightforward cases touching on south-
ern suffrage rules, such as the 1898 case of Williams v. Mississippi, in which
the Court upheld the provisions of Mississippi's state constitution providing
for a poll tax and literacy test,97 or the 1915 case of Guinn v. United States,
in which the Court struck down Oklahoma's grandfather clause. 9
If Giles was airbrushed from the constitutional canon during the two
decades following the decision, then perhaps it was more because Giles was
both a procedurally messy case and a possibly minor one among several
JR., A TREATISE ON EQUITABLE REMEDIES § 324 n.43 (1905); Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief
against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REV. 640, 681 (1916); Comment,
Power of Equity over Public Elections, 29 YALE L.J. 655 (1920).
92. Among the procedural jurisdictional questions scholars used Giles to answer was the role
of jurisdictional certification. As soon after the case as 1904, in his Handbook of Jurisdiction and
Procedure in the United States Courts, Robert M. Hughes cited Giles for the proposition that the
Supreme Court has the right to review entire cases when a state constitution is claimed to be in
contravention of the U.S. Constitution, "even though the lower court has certified a question up as a
jurisdictional question, for it is not in the power of the lower court to narrow the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court by such a certificate." ROBERT M. HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION AND PRO-
CEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS 406 (1904). Nine years later, in the second edition of the
work, Hughes used almost exactly the same words to describe the importance of Giles. ROBERT M.
HUGHES, HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE IN UNITED STATES COURTS 512 (2d ed.
1913). Clearly, for Hughes even the passage of a decade of increasingly obvious racial discrimina-
tion in the South had not changed the essential importance of Giles-at least insomuch as the case
stood for a procedural point.
93. See, e.g., I THOMAS ATKINS STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE 24-25 (1909). The
second and third "broad headings" are discussed together in Section I.B.
94. See, e.g., Note, The Alabama Franchise Case, supra note 17, at 131 (1903) (focusing on
the procedural rules and concluding that "[o]n analysis, therefore, contrary to what might be
thought, this case does not turn upon a question of constitutional law").
95. See, e.g., infra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 339
n.2 (1922); WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 195 n.18 (students ed. 1914).
97. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
98. 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
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touching on the themes of democracy and antidemocracy than because of a
"longer constitutional tradition" in the United States "in which issues of
democratic governance were off the map altogether."99 Section III.A exam-
ines how scholars in the two decades after the decision in Giles spoke and
wrote about Giles's relevance to questions of democracy and antidemocracy.
Section III.B discusses how a number of scholars in these years focused
more on Giles's political question, jurisdictional, and equity holdings than
on its link to democratic governance.
A. Focus on Constitutional Importance
While by the late twentieth century Giles may have been "airbrushed out
of the constitutional canon," in the years immediately following the decision
a number of legal and constitutional scholars and observers did focus on the
links between the case and constitutional law and democratic governance.
Even some of these scholars, however, clearly regarded the case as a minor
or unimportant example of these links, and failed to ascribe to the case the
critical importance for which Pildes argues in The Canonlro
Among the first legal observers or scholars to link the case, in an impor-
tant legal journal, to the concepts of democratic governance and
antidemocracy was the noted Michigan attorney Alfred Russell,' °  who on
June 19, 1903 read a paper before the Michigan State Bar Association in
which he identified Giles as one of the three key cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the previous months that had touched upon constitutional
concerns. °2 In its decision, Russell noted, the Court "has made a clear path
for the Southern doctrine of a white man's government."'03 Russell seems to
have been bothered by the Court's decision on political or normative
grounds, as he declined to discuss the case further so as to avoid being "led
99. Pildes, The Canon, supra note f, at 319.
100. Id. at 296 ("In this bleak and unfamiliar saga, there is one key moment, one decisive
turning point: the 1903 opinion of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Giles v. Harris.").
101. Alfred Russell, described by the American Bar Association ("ABA") as "one of the
foremost lawyers in the West," was a former U.S. Attorney in Michigan during the Civil War and
was a frequent advocate before the U.S. Supreme Court. REPORT OF THE TWENTY-NINTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssoCIATION, pt. 1,675-76 (1906); see also American Bar Associa-
tion, N.Y TiMES, Aug. 20, 1891, at 8 (announcing that Alfred Russell of Detroit would give the ABA's
annual address). Russell was also described as being on intimate terms with all of the Supreme Court
Justices; his criticism of the recently appointed Justice Holmes as being "best known... as the son of a
noted man of letters, Dr. Holmes," was either an attempt to praise Holmes's father or a clear snub from
a man who had apparently been himself considered twice for the Supreme Court, but had not been
appointed. Alfred Russell, Three Constitutional Questions Decided by the Federal Supreme Court
During the Last Four Months, 37 Am. L. REV. 503, 507 (1903). At least one publication clearly
thought it was a snub, noting that "most lawyers . .. would take exception to [Russell's words], as
Judge Holmes has long occupied a most distinguished position on the Bench, and has an intema-
tional reputation as an original thinker and jurist." Notes on Recent Leading Articles in Legal
Publications, 51 AM. L. REG. 646, 647 (1903).
102. Russell, supra note 101.
103. Id. at 503.
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astray into a partisan discussion,"' °4 but he did want to make clear his sup-
port for Holmes's "pragmatic" stance, which he saw as necessary to skirt the
problems that had helped lead to the Civil War. He noted:
The so-called Negro Question, so far from being closed, seems to me to
have just begun to be opened; but I think we will most of us agree that the
court was wise in not undertaking to determine the validity of the new pol-
icy of the white people of the Southern States, by a court of equity. The
question is too large for courts. When the Dred Scott case was decided, the
judges of that day reached a different conclusion, and thought that the
momentous question then before the nation could be, and was settled by
the court. No greater mistake was ever made in judicial annals, and I think
the existing bench has displayed wisdom and true statesmanship in holding
the powers of a court of equity unequal to the emergency.'°5
After Russell's paper, and a 1904 treatise on the Constitution containing
a short mention, '° 6 the next significant academic work to make the argument
for reading Giles as a key case in constitutional and antidemocracy terms
came not in a legal publication, but instead in the newly inaugurated Ameri-
can Political Science Review.'° In his 1906 article, John Rose identified in
Holmes's statements about political questions and separation of powers "the
real explanation of the difficulty in the way of those who seek through the
courts to compel the dominant race ... to do that which that race is almost
unanimously determined it will not do."' '0
Rose, however, did not represent the full spectrum of opinion within the
discipline of political science on the importance of Giles. Writing a year
earlier in the Political Science Quarterly, Francis Caffey (later the U.S. At-
torney for the Southern District of New York and a federal district judge in
the Southern District of New York) relegated Giles to an unimportant sup-
porting role (literally as a footnote) in his attack on the 1903 report of the
committee on political reform of the Union League Club of New York
(which had been enormously critical of the disfranchising conventions).'9
Caffey took a radically different tone than did Rose, concluding that "[t]he
predominant purpose" of the movement in Alabama to change the suffrage
104. Id. at 509.
105. Id.
106. C. STUART PATTERSON, THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATES UNDER THE CONSTITU-
TION 293-94 (2d ed. 1904). Oddly enough, in that work Patterson cited Giles and Teasley for the
propositions that "[a] state, therefore, cannot limit the right of suffrage to the white race" and that an
individual may maintain an action in damages if he has improperly been prevented from voting. Id.
Both points were technically and legally correct, but in practice Giles seemed to stand for the oppo-
site propositions.
107. John C. Rose, Negro Suffrage: The Constitutional Point of View, 1 AM. POL. Scl. REV.
17, 38-39 (1906).
108. Id. at 39, quoted in Pildes, Meaningful, supra note 3, at 652.
109. Francis G. Caffey, Suffrage Limitations at the South, 20 POL. Sci. Q. 53, 59 n.3 (1905).
Unlike Russell, Patterson, and Rose, Caffey did not view Giles as a key constitutional case, but
rather simply as an example of how challenges to the southern constitutions had consistently failed
in the courts. Id.
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requirements "was not to tie the negroes' hands, but to untie the hands of the
best of the white men."' 0 "Such a plan as that in the Alabama constitution is
not selfish," declared Caffey; "it is merely practical. It puts a premium on
good qualities of citizenship and is well calculated to attain the best and
fairest results, not for white men alone, but for negroes also."'I
After the publication of Rose's article, there was apparently little or no
analysis of Giles as an important constitutional case (though scholars and
lawyers continued to cite it for its rule on equity and its jurisdictional hold-
ings) until 1910, when both James Parker Hall,"2 the famed constitutional
scholar and dean of the University of Chicago Law School, and William C.
Coleman, writing in the Columbia Law Review, bemoaned the fact that
those wishing to challenge the southern constitutions were finding it hard to
bring the questions of disfranchisement "squarely before the Supreme
Court."' ' Hall in particular seemed angered, and attacked the grandfather
clause and like tools in his treatise on constitutional law as "produc[ing] a
practical discrimination against all negroes who are the descendants of ne-
groes who in 1867 were excluded from suffrage on account of race and
color."" 4 Hall went on to cite Giles as demonstrating Pildes and Scott's point
about the importance of the case: "It is extremely questionable whether such
provisions do not violate the Fifteenth Amendment," Hall wrote, "but it is
also very doubtful whether the United States statutes as they stand afford
any adequate procedure for testing the question in the Federal courts.""'
Thirteen years later, in what appears to be the seventh edition of the same
work, Hall discussed Giles as an example of a case in which "it may be im-
possible to secure a judicial declaration of the invalidity of a statute," even
though the statute is clearly unconstitutional, because the existing statutes
regulating jurisdiction and judicial procedure do not permit a proper rem-
edy." 6 "Congress has apparently not provided any effective procedure for
the enforcement in the Federal courts of the right of suffrage in a state," he
concluded, "even when improperly denied by the state through the require-
ment of an unconstitutional system of registration as preliminary to
voting.". 7
Despite Hall's clear impatience with the Court and the arguments made
by Patterson and Rose about the critical nature of the Giles opinion, many
110. Id. at 57.
111. Id.
112. JAMES PARKER HALL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 79-81 (1910).
113. William C. Coleman, The Fifteenth Amendment, 10 COLUM. L. REv. 416, 448 n.73
(1910).
114. HALL, supra note 112, at 80.
115. Id. Hall also went on to note that a restriction on the franchise that was facially race
neutral and applied in a race-neutral manner, thereby eliminating both whites and blacks from the
voting rolls, would probably be constitutional. Id. at 81 (citing Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S.
213, 222 (1898)).




constitutional scholars in the two decades after the Giles decision apparently
agreed with Francis Caffey that Giles was a relatively unimportant case in
the Court's jurisprudence. The political scientist Westel Willoughby,"" for
instance, instead focused his attention on Williams v. Mississippi, the 1898
case in which the Court unanimously upheld (as not facially discrimina-
tory, and so not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment) the provisions in
Mississippi's state constitution providing for a poll tax and literacy test."
9
In his texts on constitutional law, Willoughby simply referred his readers
to Giles and Teasley "[flor other attempts to obtain judicial pronounce-
ments upon the constitutionality of these disfranchising clauses in the
State Constitutions."'20 Even in some articles in which scholars did discuss
Giles as a disfranchisement case, the authors made no effort to single
Giles out as a pivotal moment in the Court's jurisprudence or in the devel-
opment of antidemocracy in the United States. In a 1921 article on African
American citizenship, for instance, the renowned African American histo-
rian Carter G. Woodson12 simply listed and described Giles (albeit at some
length) as merely one more case, sandwiched between a little-known case
about the poll tax and Teasley.1
22
Perhaps most indicative of how little importance some influential schol-
ars and legal figures ascribed to Giles was the treatment of the case in
Charles Warren's 1922 Pulitzer Prize-winning The Supreme Court in United
States History.12 Warren made scant and passing reference to Giles in his
work. 1 4 He had been an Assistant Attorney General of the United States be-
tween 1912 and 1916; that he placed Giles alongside Williams v. Mississippi
as simply one of the cases upholding the provisions in some southern consti-
tutions preventing blacks from voting suggests that that he did not identify
Giles as a critical moment in the Court's jurisprudence. In fact, Warren-
perhaps attempting to present a positive reading of the Court's trajectory, or
perhaps focusing on a case that did not bring with it Giles's procedural oddi-
ties-instead focused on Guinn. 2 Giles was not yet "airbrushed" from
118. Westel Willoughby, perhaps the "father of political science," founded the Political Sci-
ence Department at Johns Hopkins University and became known as an expert on Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
119. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 96, at 195 n.18; WESTEL W. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 195 n. 18 (1912).
120. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 96, at 195 n.18; WILLOUGHBY, supra note 119, at 195 n.18.
121. Woodson was the second African American (after W.E.B. Dubois) to be awarded a
Harvard doctorate. He went on to found The Journal of Negro History (now the Journal of African-
American History) in 1916. Woodson was also primarily responsible for inaugurating the celebra-
tion of Negro History Week, which has become Black History Month. For more information on
Woodson, see The Carter G. Woodson Institute for African-American and African Studies at the
University of Virginia, About the Institute, http://artsandsciences.virginia.edu/woodson/about/
index.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
122. Carter G. Woodson, Fifty Years of Negro Citizenship as Qualified by the United States
Supreme Court, 6 J. NEGRO His-r. 1, 38-41 (1921).
123. 3 WARREN, supra note 96, at 339-40 n.2.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)).
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constitutional discourse, but it is clear that it was already being marginalized
in favor of cleaner cases, in which those challenging antidemocratic meas-
ures achieved greater success than did Jackson Giles.
B. Political Questions, Jurisdiction, and Equity
Even as some constitutional scholars in the two decades after the Giles
decision focused on the links between the decision and questions of democ-
ratic governance, other scholars instead-in perhaps the key step for
airbrushing Giles from the constitutional canon or pushing Giles off center
stage-focused on the importance of Giles's political question, jurisdic-
tional, or equity holdings. In doing so, these scholars perhaps helped
transform the case from one about voting rights into one about how courts
sitting in equity or deciding jurisdictional questions should act.
In the late 1910s, several legal scholars and the authors of practitioner
handbooks began to focus on the political question holding of Giles-the
holding that courts sitting in equity rather than in law would not decide
political questions. Before that time, the only scholarly mention of the
political question holding of the case came in a footnote in John Norton
Pomeroy's 1904 treatise on equitable remedies. 26 In 1916, however, Roscoe
Pound, the incoming dean of Harvard Law School, cited Giles in a Harvard
Law Review article for the case's denial of equitable relief on political
question grounds. 27 Pound was not the only scholar or attorney to turn his
attention to this holding: three years later, for instance, a publication of the
Library of American Law and Practice quoted the case to illustrate Holmes's
point that "[t]he traditional limits of proceedings in equity have not
embraced a remedy for political wrongs."'' 28 In 1920, University of Missouri
Law Professor George L. Clark similarly used Giles to illustrate the rule on
political questions in his treatise on equity. That same year, the Yale Law
Journal published a Comment in part examining the importance to
separation-of-powers doctrine of the Giles limit on courts sitting in equity
over political questions. 30
While some scholars were citing Giles to illustrate the holding about po-
litical questions, others in the decade immediately after the decision viewed
Giles as standing for a general equitable rule about court efficacy. In 1909,
for example, in his treatise on federal equity practice, Thomas Atkins Street,
a professor at both Vanderbilt and the University of Missouri, and a future
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, cited Giles for
the proposition that when a court of equity determines whether it can take
126. 1 POMEROY, supra note 91, § 324 n.43 (using Giles to illustrate the use of injunctions in
political question cases).
127. Pound, supra note 91, at 681 n. 114.
128. AM. TECHNICAL Soc'Y, supra note 91, at 92.
129. CLARK, supra note 91, at 320 n.9.
130. Comment, supra note 91, at 655-59.
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jurisdiction, "one of the first questions is what it can do to enforce any order
that it may make."'
' 3
1
More common than the view that Giles stood for the proposition that a
court should not mandate a remedy where it cannot enforce that remedy was
the view that Giles was less of a critical case about democratic governance
than it was a procedural mess. As early as 1903, the Harvard Law Review
focused on the procedural rules employed in the Giles decision, concluding
that "[o]n analysis, therefore, contrary to what might be thought, this case
does not turn upon a question of constitutional law."'32 Just over a decade
later, a Note in the Columbia Law Review echoed the Harvard Law Review's
conclusion. 33 Even Gilbert Thomas Stephenson, who wrote the influential
Race Distinctions in American Law, believed that Giles was of no particular
importance, instead viewing the case (along with Teasley, Mills v. Green,'34
Jones v. Montague,3 5 and Selden v. Montague3 6) as one in which the Court
had ducked the central question by focusing on procedural oddities. 17
By 1924, two years after Charles Warren glossed over Giles in his analy-
sis of voting rights cases in The Supreme Court in United States History,1
38
the case had come for some key scholars to stand chiefly for the proposition
that there were limits on what the Supreme Court would, or should, do. In
their exhaustive 1924 Harvard Law Review article on aspects of separation
of powers in the context of criminal contempt trials, for instance, Felix
Frankfurter, later an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and James
Landis, later the dean of Harvard Law School, cited Giles for the proposition
that "[t]he aptitude of judges and the quality of judicial machinery puts
bounds, as a practical matter, to the kind of business which should come be-
fore the courts and which, therefore, courts will assume."'3 9 For Frankfurter
and Landis-two men who helped define the evolution of legal thought and
"the canon" in the first half of the twentieth century-Giles was useful as a
tool in identifying the boundaries of the separate powers of courts. While this
reference was only a passing one, it reinforces the conclusion that within two
decades of the decision some of the key legal and constitutional scholars had
effectively removed Giles from the context of antidemocracy, and instead
placed it in the context of separation of powers, jurisdiction, or equity.
131. 1 STREET, supra note 93, at 25.
132. Note, The Alabama Franchise Case, supra note 17, at 131.
133. Note, Constitutionality of the Grandfather Clause, supra note 17, at 337 n.7 (explaining
that Giles was decided on nonconstitutional grounds).
134. 159 U.S. 651 (1895).
135. 194 U.S. 147 (1904).
136. 194 U.S. 153 (1904).
137. GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 314-15, 345
n.65 (1910).
138. See supra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
139. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010,
1021 (1924).
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CONCLUSION
If by the beginning of the twenty-first century Giles had been airbrushed
from the constitutional canon, as Richard Pildes suggests, the roots of that
process probably lay in the two decades immediately following the Court's
decision. Historians and legal scholars of democracy, antidemocracy, race,
and voting rights should not conclude, however, that because the case had
largely disappeared from the constitutional corpus by 2000 that no legal
scholar ever ascribed to it the importance Pildes does in The Canon, or that
no legal scholars of the early twentieth century were interested in issues of
democratic governance.' 4° In the immediate aftermath of the decision, and in
the two decades following the publication of the Court's opinion, a number
of journalists, scholars, and practicing attorneys focused on Giles as a criti-
cal moment in the evolving legal disfranchisement of African Americans in
southern states. At the same time, however, some of the most influential
scholars marginalized the decision as simply another minor example of a
general trend, while others ignored altogether Giles's linkage to core ques-
tions of democracy, and instead used the opinion to explain or illustrate
abstruse doctrinal rules about political questions, separation of powers, and
jurisdiction. By the mid-1920s, even those voices arguing for the critical
importance of Giles were fading as legal scholars interested in the growth of
democracy and democratic governance apparently turned their attention-
both in terms of advocacy and in terms of legal-historical scholarship-to
cleaner, more recent, and more publicly "noisy" decisions that perhaps high-
lighted more successful judicial challenges. Giles was not airbrushed from
the constitutional canon; instead, it simply faded away as seemingly more
important cases were superimposed on the constitutional scene.
140. But see Pildes, The Canon, supra note t, at 319.
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